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INTRODUCTION

“Whether it’s Google or Apple or free software, we’ve got some fantastic
competitors and it keeps us on our toes.”1 Competition plays a pivotal role in
innovation and creation and competitors should absolutely keep major players
on their toes.
Competition is, or should be, a defining characteristic of the American
economic system.2 Over time, structural changes have stifled competition
instead of fostering it. This is clear particularly in the technology industry, where
giants have emerged and assumed positions of unique societal importance. “In
. . . communities, Facebook is the internet and Amazon is retail delivery. More
widely, students, jobseekers, and journalists. . . require access to Google’s
educational suite, LinkedIn or Twitter just to do their work.”3
Due to growing reliance on technology, consumers are constantly looking for
new developments and improvements to goods and services being offered in the
marketplace.4 However, provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) largely serve to hinder critical forms of competition that could lead to
more consumer-friendly developments. Specifically, §1201 of DMCA prevents
what is known as adversarial interoperability—essentially creating a product or
service that works with an existing one without that creator’s direct consent.
Adversarial interoperability was the hallmark of the tech-growth era, and was
used by Apple, Facebook, and IBM in their climbs to the top of their fields. 5
Thus, Americans are largely stuck with what the tech companies are willing
to give them. People hate Facebook.6 General enthusiasm for Amazon is

1 One-on-One with Bill Gates, ABC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2008, 5:36 PM) (interview between Bill
Gates and Peter Jennings, an ABC journalist, conducted on February 16, 2005).
2 FTC Fact Sheet: How Competition Works, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: PROTECTING
AMERICA’S CONSUMERS,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/games/offsite/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-Competition_How-Comp-Works.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2020).
3 Jeanette Herrle, Tearing Down a Tech Giant’s Walled Garden, CTR. FOR INT’L. GOVERNANCE
(Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/tearing-down-tech-giants-walled-garden.
4 Amanda Mull, Gadgets for Life on a Miserable Planet, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/01/why-do-people-still-love-consumertech/604909/.
5 Cory Doctorow, Adversarial Interoperability: Reviving an Elegant Weapon From a More Civilized
Age to Slay Today’s Monopolies, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (June 7,
2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/adversarial-interoperability-reviving-elegantweapon-more-civilized-age-slay.
6 Mark Murray, Poll: Americans Give Social Media a Clear Thumbs-Down, NBC NEWS (Apr. 5,
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/poll-americans-give-socialmedia-clear-thumbs-down-n991086 (showing that 60% of Americans do not trust Facebook’s
security measures, only 36% view Facebook favorably overall, and 82% view it is a waste of
time).
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shrinking.7 People continue to use these services in droves because there are no
meaningful or feasible alternatives.8 The solution is permitting companies or
innovators to deliver products that work with existing platforms to fill in gaps or
offer new avenues for consumers to get what they want.9 Two-thirds of
Americans agree that tech giants like Google and Amazon are too big. 10 While
it likely would not be a silver bullet solution, a repeal of §1201 of the DMCA
would help reinvigorate entrepreneurial spirit and give consumers more choices.
Part II of this Note discusses the background of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) and §1201 of the law, which prevents technological
circumvention of protected works. This part also discusses aspects of adversarial
interoperability relevant to the Note’s analysis and some of the impacts being
seen in the big-tech space as a result. Specifically, this part further defines
adversarial interoperability and explores the expansion of §1201 application to
curtail it. Additionally, this part analyzes how many big companies are benefitted
by the status quo and how they use §1201 to effectively dismantle competition
from the very start by creating the “Kill Zone.” Part III of this Note analyzes
adversarial interoperability more specifically, looking at both the benefits and
potential drawbacks of a redeveloped legal scheme surrounding the activity and
then examines French efforts to balance consumer and developer interests.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
with intentions of protecting owners of copyrights against acts of digital piracy

7 Dennis Green, Amazon’s Reputation is Taking a Beating from All Sides. Here’s What a
Reputation Expert Says it Should Do to Turn Things Around, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2018, 10:40
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-reputation-falls-in-annual-ranking-2018-9
(explaining that Amazon has lost the top spot in the Reputation Institute’s retail reputation
rankings and in the general American company rankings—falling to tenth place).
8 Stuart Dredge, You’ve Decided to Delete Facebook But What Will You Replace It With?, THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
31,
2018)
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/31/youve-decided-to-deletefacebook-but-what-will-you-replace-it-with (noting for example that Facebook itself owns
other social media services and replacing its use would require a difficult patchwork of other
services).
9 Id.
10 Emily Stewart, Poll: Two-Thirds of Americans Want to Break up Companies Like Amazon and
Google, VOX (Sept. 18, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/9/18/20870938/break-up-big-tech-google-facebook-amazon-poll (detailing
widespread support for breaking up the tech companies for competition purposes—support
which is equally distributed amongst individuals self-identifying as Democrats, Republicans,
or independents).
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and theft of the protected works.11 After going into effect in 2000, the DMCA
worked to handle an array of copyright protection challenges inherent to an
increasingly digital society.12 The DMCA was the product of collaboration on
the part of “publishers, scientists, civil rights groups and others,” and is
considered to be a “compromise measure” by these groups who often have
directly competing interests.13 Because the DMCA was the target of significant
criticism from various parties in the technological space, revisions to the Act
were made to carve out certain exceptions that would allow for activities such as
encryption and security research.14 Despite some of these revisions being made,
calls for further changes remain.15
B. SECTION 1201 OF THE DMCA

The DMCA provisions most relevant to this paper are both in §1201. 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) states, “No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof” that works to circumvent technological measures
aimed at restricting access to copyrighted works.16 Section 1201(b) prohibits the
same conduct and further protects the copyright owner from actions that could
work against technological safeguards to that protected work.17 The provisions
largely take aim at devices or objects that are designed primarily with the
circumventing of technological protection measures in mind.18 The law also
focuses on devices or objects which hold very limited commercial value outside
of their ability to circumvent these technological protective measures on
protected works.19 In the current scheme, courts generally reason that

11 See generally Dan I. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1135 (2003)
(describing the legislative intent of Congress when it wrote and passed the DMCA).
12 The Ultimate Guide to Digital Millennium Copyright Act, COPYRIGHTED (May 15, 2018)
https://www.copyrighted.com/blog/dmca-guide.
13 Margaret Rouse, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), TECHTARGET (Mar. 2011)
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Digital-Millennium-Copyright-Act-DMCA.
14 Id. (explaining that Congress created a carve out that allows individuals to engage in
otherwise illegal digital lock circumventing activity so long as the activity is a good faith effort
in encryption security research).
15 It’s Time to Fix the DMCA, REPAIR, https://repair.org/copyright (last visited Sept. 27,
2020) (citing Kyle Wiens, Forget the Cellphone Fight – We Should Be Allowed to Unlock Everything
We Own, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2013, 9:30 AM))(outlining the need for comprehensive reforms
because products are becoming increasingly integrated with technology and the DMCA
fundamentally changes the nature of ownership of tech-based products by giving more power
to the creators even afterr commercial sales).
16 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2020).
17 Id. § 1201(b).
18 Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (b)(1)(A).
19 Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)(B).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

5

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

158

1/15/2021 3:55 AM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 28:1

individuals charged with violating §1201 of the DMCA cannot use traditional
intellectual property defenses like fair use, as actions taken in the spirit of
circumventing digital copyright protections are not “use” per se, but are rather
issues of “access.”20 The DMCA has included some enumerated defenses
against charges for infringement, including those for nonprofit library actions,
law enforcement related activities, intelligence analysis and gathering agencies,
and other governmental agencies.21
C. INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability is the term used to describe a product’s capability to work
with different products.22 It is largely the same thing in the technological space:
interoperability is “the technical ability to plug one product or service into
another product or service.”23
There are three distinct categories of technological interoperability, and the
different versions impact consumers and copyright holders in different ways.
First, there is “indifferent” interoperability, where the copyright holder largely
does not mind or care about the device that works with their protected work.24
A basic example of this is cigarette lighter phone chargers.25 The developer of
the cigarette lighter in a car would have no reason to know someone is plugging
a phone charger into their product, and even if they did, there is no tangible
threat to their protected work.
Next, there is “cooperative” interoperability, where the developer of the
protected product is eager to allow others to create add-ons or features to their
existing product.26 For this, one can think of phone manufacturers including
standard 3.5mm headphone jacks into their phones or installing standard
Bluetooth chips27 into their phones; consumers are allowed to plug in or connect
20 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that fair use cannot be used as a valid defense against charges brought under 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 of the DMCA for copyright infringement).
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (2020) (providing specific defenses for “lawfully authorized
investigative, protective, information security, or intelligence activity” among other protected
classes of activities).
22 Interoperability,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/interoperability (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
23 Cory Doctorow, Interoperability: Fix the Internet, Not the Tech Companies, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
DEEPLINKS
BLOG
(July
19,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/07/interoperability-fix-internet-not-tech-companies.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. (describing how things can get tricky here if the copyright holder uses “digital
standards,” which can discriminate by allowing certain products to be compatible with theirs,
depending on the manufacturer or individual product. This can also benefit consumers if
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any compatible device, and the phone manufacturer benefits from the widened
array of capabilities their product now offers.
Finally, there is “adversarial” interoperability, which involves a manufacturer
developing a product that works with another product whose developer is openly
hostile toward it.28 This could be something like third-party replacement parts
or unauthorized computer or phone applications. 29 Simply put, regardless of
whatever advances or improved service experience is offered by the new device,
the copyright holder does not want that development taking place, as that device
is generally seen as a threat to its economic interests in the copyrighted material. 30
D. THE RAPID EXPANSION OF §1201 APPLICATION IN THE WAKE OF LEXMARK

Section 1201 of the DMCA was once a relatively small puzzle piece in the
copyright enforcement regime. However, as “smart” devices and technology
have become significantly less expensive, the provision has become increasingly
important.31 One of the first major cases to involve §1201 concerned Lexmark
and its printer ink cartridges designed specifically for use with Lexmark’s own
printers.32 Lexmark sold refillable ink cartridges, but offered customers a sizable
discount on “Prebate” toner that required users to return the empty cartridges
to Lexmark to be refilled.33 If users wanted to retain the right to refill the
cartridges on their own or through a third party, a full priced option was available
for purchase.34 The “Prebate” cartridges came equipped with a rudimentary
computer chip which calculated the amount of ink used over time and prevented
the printer from operating when the ink was set to run out, regardless of whether
the user had refilled the ink.35
A second company, Static Control Components (“SCC”), developed a
computer chip that could communicate with the Lexmark printer and allow the
refilled cartridge to satisfy the printer’s “Toner Loading Program.”36 SCC began
selling these “Smartek” computer chips to retailers offering cartridge-refilling
consumers are warned that a certain device may be more susceptible to security or other
defects.).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Adam Thierer, On Doctorow’s “Adversarial Interoperability”, THE TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION
FRONT (Aug. 29, 2020).
31 Cory Doctorow, America’s Broken Digital Copyright Law Is About to Be Challenged in Court,
THE
GUARDIAN
(July
21,
2016)
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/21/digital-millennium-copyright-acteff-supreme-court.
32 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
33 Id. at 529.
34 Id. at 530.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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services.37 SCC’s new computer chips were found to not violate §1201 largely
because the lockout feature of the Lexmark program was not safeguarding a
protected work.38
Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of
the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory,
with or without the benefit of the authentication sequence, and
the data from the program may be translated into readable source
code after which copies may be freely distributed.39
The concurrence of the opinion even went as far as to suggest that the computer
chip’s relative lack of sophistication added to its failure to rise to the level of a
protectected work under §1201 and other copyright laws.40 The core of the
holding was that for computer systems to be protectable under copyright
theories, there needed to be a creative aspect separate from the functional aspect
of the targeted work.41 Thus, a simple digital lockout feature like the printer
cartridge computer chip could be bypassed through interoperability if the
interoperating product included independently-created programs.42
In the years following the Lexmark decision, it became increasingly feasible
for companies to add relatively sophisticated computer chips or other digital
locking mechanisms to products that could rise to the level of a protected work
under §1201. Companies now look at the inexpensive nature of embedded
systems as an avenue to making §1201 a very useful tool in heading off any
worthy attempts at adversarial interoperability.
For example, Hasbro is now using embedded computer chip systems in its
current line of Nerf toy guns.43 The plastic darts come equipped with RFID
chips that are required for the gun to “fire.”44 The computer chips were
introduced to provide users the ability to more accurately determine which toy
gun was responsible for a “hit.”45 These chips serve the dual function of also
preventing users from buying and using alternative darts found on the secondary

Id.
Id. at 549.
39 Id. at 547.
40 Id. at 552.
41 Id. at 529.
42 Id. at 546-47.
43 Smart Dart, NERF WIKI, https://nerf.fandom.com/wiki/Smart_Dart (last visited Oct.
20, 2020).
44 Id.
45 See id. (explaining that “[d]arts can be scanned to clarify who ‘owns’ which dart”).
37
38
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market.46 While secondary darts can be purchased by the hundreds for around
twenty dollars, the official Hasbro RFID-equipped rounds sell for ten dollars for
twenty units.47 As the toy guns read these computer chips, they “won’t fire and
will skip to the next chamber” if “the blaster detects an incompatible dart in the
drum.”48
These computer chip access locks are sophisticated and widespread.49
Consequently, these types of electronic access locks are found in products like
car parts, advanced toner and ink cartridges, electronics parts, coffee pods, and
children’s toys.50 Essentially, this expansion of computer chip access control
technology has led to §1201 becoming something of a first line of defense against
adversarial interoperability.
E. ADVERSARIAL INTEROPERABILITY IN BIG TECH

Before the passage of the DMCA, and even to an extent after its passage,
adversarial interoperability was generally allowed and not prohibited wholesale.51
“Adversarial interoperability was once the driver of tech’s dynamic marketplace,
where the biggest firms could go from [the] top of the heap to scrap metal in an
eyeblink, where tiny startups could topple dominant companies before they even
knew what hit them.”52 Court decisions after Lexmark have shown a greatly
expanded scope of §1201 application that is now a useful tool wielded by some
manufacturers or patent holders.53 As §1201 of the DMCA continues to limit

46 Cory Doctorow, Nerf Unveils “DRM for Darts,” BOINGBOING (Sept. 24, 2019, 8:59 PM),
https://boingboing.net/2019/09/24/unauthorizeddarts.html?_ga=2.268342413.2078055967.1574439202-594014214.1574439202.
47 Paul Ziobro, Parents, Beware: Nerf’s Newest Blasters Won’t Fire Knockoff Darts, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/parents-beware-nerfs-newest-blasters-wontfire-knockoff-darts-11569240001.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g. Sean Gallagher, HP’s DRM Sabotages Off-Brand Printer Ink Cartridges with SelfDestruct Date, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 19, 2016) https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2016/09/hps-drm-sabotages-off-brand-printer-ink-cartridges-with-self-destructdate/ (describing HP’s chip lock technology allowing printers to label off-brand cartridges as
“damaged” and in need of replacement).
50 Id.; see also Kyle Wiens, WTF! It Should Not Be Illegal to Hack Your Own Car’s Computer,
WIRED (Jan. 23, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/let-us-hack-our-cars/
(describing the complex web of computer chips built into modern cars to prevent owners
from using certain after-market parts or customizations); see also Keurig 2.0 Coffeemakers Have a
Built-In
Detective,
MOUSEPRINT
(May
4,
2015,
6:04
AM),
https://www.mouseprint.org/2015/05/04/keurig-2-0-coffeemakers-have-a-built-indetective/.
51 Doctorow, supra note 5.
52 Id.
53 Unintended Consequences: Sixteen Years under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Sept. 2014), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/09/16/unintendedconsequences2014.pdf.
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the ability for potential competitors to develop interoperable products or services
that directly conflict with the dominant party’s service, the dominant parties have
experienced tremendous growth and exert significant control over the
marketplace.54 Ironically, many of these tech giants reached their dominant
status after using adversarial interoperability to compete with more wellestablished competitors during their formative stages.55 Facebook used
adversarial interoperability to take on Myspace, and now Facebook boasts nearly
2.5 billion users, many of whom are dissatisfied with the service but have no
viable alternative to join.56
Under normal market conditions, a steadily-growing company with over two
billion customers would be a perfect target for investors in competing
businesses.57 Instead, companies like Facebook are firmly cemented in a position
of dominance, as user and service information remain protected behind digital
locks and competing startups essentially have a nonexistent chance of disrupting
the market.
Many useful and valuable tech ideas are not inherently revolutionary. They
are simply a logical leap from already existing technology and push the market
forward. Because tech giants have a stranglehold on the use of their products
and infrastructure, potential competitors cannot develop new products that are
aimed at improving the consumers’ overall experiences.58 The widespread
dissatisfaction with platforms like Facebook creates a large target for tech
startups to focus on, but innovators are severely limited in their efforts to deliver
new products.59
F. THE KILL. ZONE

The dominance of big tech companies is poised to remain intact. While
entrepreneur and tech startups used to play a huge role in the American
economy, the creation of startups is close to a 40-year low.60 Investors,
Id.
Doctorow, supra note 5 (discussing how Facebook expedited its own development by
creating a tool that allowed its subscribers to continue communicating with Myspace
subscribers, decreasing the utility of Myspace’s product, and serving as a recruiting tool for its
own service).
56 Id. (discussing how Facebook users are “stuck” with the service because their friends are
also using the service).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Doctorow, supra note 5.
60 Heather Long, Where Are All the Startups? U.S. Entrepreneurship Near 40-Year Low, CNN
(Sept. 8, 2016, 10:10 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/news/economy/usstartups-near-40-year-low/index.html (discussing how big tech companies are beginning to
adopt more of an entrepreneurial culture that captures much of what startups can offer and
that the “Great Recession” had a fatal impact for startups that has not yet been remedied).
54
55
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developers, and entrepreneurs “are now wary of entering into direct competition
with giants like Google and Facebook. Both companies, along with Amazon and
Apple, effectively have a ‘Kill Zone’ around them—areas not worth operating or
investing in, since defeat is guaranteed.”61 That guaranteed defeat comes in the
form of either an outright market loss to the dominant company or having no
choice but to sell to the dominant company with which they would otherwise
have competed.62 The “Big Five” tech companies (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Microsoft) have completed purchases and acquisitions of nearly
500 competing companies in the past decade.63 Investors see the “Kill Zone” as
being a very real thing, with angel investors noting that they will only invest “in
things that are not in Facebook’s, Apple’s, Amazon’s, or Google’s kill zone.”64
While consolidation is not specific to the big tech industry, “initial venture-capital
financings have declined by much more in the past few years than in comparable
industries. This suggests the kill zone is real.”65
Given the tech giants’ current footprint in digital communication, it is
difficult for startups to invest in and develop competing technology in that
space.66 Development of these types of products requires access to cloud
services, social and search advertisements, and app stores. Amazon and Google
control the largest cloud services products, and tech giants generally control app
stores.67 As such, the entry of these innovators into a dominant player’s market
can be closely monitored by that dominant player. It is not hard to see how this
level of access in the development stage would give the dominant player yet

61 Asher Schechter, Google and Facebook’s “Kill Zone”: “We’ve Taken the Focus Off of Rewarding
Genius and Innovation to Rewarding Capital and Scale”, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. STIGLER CTR.:
PROMARKET BLOG (May 25, 2018), https://promarket.org/google-facebooks-kill-zone-wevetaken-focus-off-rewarding-genius-innovation-rewarding-capital-scale/.
62 Id.
63 Id. (describing the resources the Big Five have at their disposal to absorb competing
entities without any resistance at all from antitrust authorities).
64 Id.
65 Noah Smith, Big Tech Sets up a “Kill Zone” for Industry Upstarts, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2018,
7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-07/big-tech-sets-up-akill-zone-for-industry-upstarts (discussing a study looking at investments in internet retail,
internet software, and social/platform software, areas directly relating to the industries
dominated by Amazon, Google, and Facebook); see also James Pethokoukis, A New Analysis
Takes a Shot at the Idea Big Tech Has Created a “Kill Zone” for Startups, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE: AEIDEAS (July, 12 2018) https://www.aei.org/economics/a-new-analysis-takes-ashot-at-the-idea-big-tech-has-created-a-kill-zone-for-startups/ (discussing how the one major
study conducted which criticizes the view that major tech companies have created a “kill zone”
was funded by Facebook itself).
66 Id.
67 James Pethokoukis, Are the Mega-Platforms Good or Bad for Tech Innovation? An Interesting
Conversation, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: AEIDEAS (Nov. 13 2017),
https://www.aei.org/economics/are-the-mega-platforms-good-or-bad-for-tech-innovationan-interesting-conversation/.
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another advantage. Essentially, investors can see the threat of the dominant
player either coming in and developing a similar product (with the benefit of
more resources) or buying out the innovator early to then sit on the new
technology.68
While much innovation used to happen in the “fabled garage,” spurred by
innovators in unsophisticated startups, the world of technology innovation and
product development has become “a playground for giants.”69 Smaller startups
no longer have the same potential they did twenty years ago. The chances that a
startup will succeed continue to drop, and the Big Five own or control much of
the digital infrastructure necessary to play in the tech space.70 In other words,
“the smaller guys must pay a sizable tax just for existing.”71 The current legal
framework allows these giants to continue operating unchallenged.72
As an illustrative example of this kill-zone’s implications, “Facebook and its
subsidiaries are over ten times more valuable than the next two largest social
media companies outside China—Twitter and Snapchat—combined.”73 As
Facebook continues to grow in power and market share, the ability for any
potential competitors to penetrate the market takes a sizable hit.74 Steady,
unchecked growth enables Facebook to continue to buy out potential
competitors (like Instagram) and to “wag[e] wars . . . against others (like
Snapchat)” when it cannot buy them out.75
Consequently, users have no viable alternatives in the social media space,
regardless of users’ thoughts on Facebook’s censorship of certain public

68 Farhad Manjoo, How the Frightful Five Put Start-Ups in a Lose-Lose Situation, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/technology/frightful-five-startups.html.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. (describing how smaller startups must pay money to the dominant competitors for
using tech infrastructure like clouds, app stores, ad networks, and venture firms).
72 Schechter, supra note 61 (quoting Albert Wenger, Managing Partner, Union Square
Ventures, Remarks at the Stigler Center’s 2018 Antitrust and Competition Conference (Apr.
20, 2018)) (“Facebook’s position is not contestable by a new startup, because [the new startup]
can’t create software that would let people participate simultaneously without extra effort in
both my system and Facebook’s system, because Facebook can shut me out.”).
73 Bennett Cyphers & Danny O’Brien, Facing Facebook: Data Portability and Interoperability Are
Anti-Monopoly Medicine, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (July 24, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/facing-facebook-data-portability-andinteroperability-are-anti-monopoly-medicine.
74 See Will Oremus, The Search for the Anti-Facebook: Why Rival Social Networks Keep Emerging—
And Keep Failing, SLATE (Oct. 28, 2014) https://slate.com/technology/2014/10/ello-diasporaand-the-anti-facebook-why-alternative-social-networks-cant-win.html (describing viable
alternative social networks and their inability to take hold because no matter how many users
they gain, they still feel like “ghost towns” compared to the wildly popular Facebook).
75 Id.
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speech,76 performance of massive psychological experiments on users without
knowledge or permission,77 and sizable influence on election results.78 These
problems are significantly worsened when there are no viable competing
products for consumers to choose. 79 Virtually everyone using the same platform
makes potentially dangerous speech even more dangerous and arguably
necessitates steps to curb that speech.80 Large user pools are easy targets for
advertising, and even psychological, experimentation without user knowledge.81
This same user pool represents a large portion of voters, making information
campaigns easier and more direct than if conducted over numerous platforms. 82
G. DMCA §1201 LITIGATION

Section 1201 of the DMCA has been the subject of many lawsuits since it
took effect in 2000, and predictably, the litigation focuses largely on instances
76 Betsy McCaughey, Don’t Let Zuckerberg Kill Free Speech, REALCLEAR POLITICS (May 15,
2019),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/05/15/dont_let_zuckerberg_kill_free_spe
ech_140331.html (detailing how representatives from Facebook, Google, and Twitter joined
with European leaders to propose limitations on free speech because “[t]he question of what
speech should be acceptable and what is harmful needs to be defined by regulation, by
thoughtful governments”).
77 Samuel Gibbs, Facebook Apologises for Psychological Experiments on Users, THE GUARDIAN
(July 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/02/facebook-apologisespsychological-experiments-on-users (detailing a Facebook executive’s public apology for
conducting a psychological experiment on nearly 700,000 users by selectively removing
emotional words from users’ news feeds to monitor effects on “likes” and reactions to posts).
78 George Riedel, Facebook and Election Influence: Will History Repeat Itself?, FORBES (Aug. 8,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2019/08/08/facebook-andelection-influence-will-history-repeat-itself/#4a42ff48126b (detailing how technology-driven
efforts to sway voter opinions in the 2016 election reached new heights, with Facebook being
the primary weapon of choice for influencers as far away as Russia, and highlighting how these
efforts were so successful that “spending by U.S. politicians in the 2018 midterm elections was
up 25 times from 2014 midterms”).
79 Ezra Klein, Facebook Is a Capitalism Problem, Not a Mark Zuckerberg Problem, VOX (May 10,
2019) https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/10/18563895/facebook-chris-hughes-markzuckerberg-break-up-monopoly.
80 Luke Darby, Facebook Knows It’s Engineered to “Exploit the Human Brain’s Attraction to
Divisiveness”, GQ (May 27, 2020) https://www.gq.com/story/facebook-spare-the-share.
81 Kashmir Hill, Facebook Manipulated 689,003 Users’ Emotions for Science, FORBES (June 28,
2014)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/28/facebook-manipulated689003-users-emotions-for-science/#623643a9197c; see also Andrew Hutchinson, Facebook
Adds a New “Experiments” Element to Ad Manager to Help Optimize Ad Performance, SOCIAL MEDIA
TODAY (Mar. 31, 2020) (describing Facebook’s addition of an explicitly experimental function
available to advertisers to better understand consumers).
82 Dipayan Ghosh & Ben Scott, Facebook’s New Controversy Shows How Easily Online Political
Ads Can Manipulate You, TIME (Mar. 19, 2018) https://time.com/5197255/facebookcambridge-analytica-donald-trump-ads-data/.
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where copyright holders challenge adversarial interoperability.83 Most of these
cases involve competing companies developing actual, tangible goods designed
to have interoperability capacity with an established product. 84 In United States v.
Reichert, the court upheld a man’s conviction after he was found to have modified
people’s video game consoles to allow them to run other software on the
machines.85 Reichert provided the service to people who had already legally
purchased or acquired the video game consoles and did not sell any additional
services or subscriptions that were counter to the video game console
developer’s interests.86
Other examples have included litigation surrounding the use of third-party
replacement automatic garage door openers, third-party replacement parts for
cars or trucks, and the unlocking or “jailbreaking” of smartphones to be used on
any wireless service network.87 While most of these cases deal with the
development of tangible products that offer consumers interoperable services,
the Craigslist example is rather different. Craigslist initiated two suits which dealt
with a party actually creating a service that allowed for adversarial interoperability
by letting consumers access the information or infrastructure of a competing
party (essentially the same type of adversarial interoperability used by Facebook
when allowing users to access Myspace contacts and information). 88
83 See, e.g. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004) (challenging third party printer cartridges).
84 See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (concerning the
creation of an add-on that allowed users to remove PDF file restrictions enabling e-book
owners to store and access protected files on any e-reading device); Sony Comput. Entm’t.
Am., Inc. v. Divinio, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (concerning the creation of
“mod chips” that enabled Playstation owners to run third-party software on the consoles);
Apple, Inc. v. Psystar, Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dealing with the creation
and sale of computer systems that worked with a modified version of Apple’s OS X operating
system).
85 747 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2014).
86 Id. at 448.
87 See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(discussing defendant business of making replacement garage door openers that involved
reverse engineering the replacements by accessing the original computer code); United States
v. Wittich, 54 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. La. 2014) (discussing defendant business of selling
replacement Mercedes-Benz parts and diagnostic tools that would allow individuals to load
diagnostic software onto third-party electronic devices, meaning consumers could diagnose
issues with their cars without going to the dealership); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475
F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (discussing defendant business of unlocking or jailbreaking
cellphones to allow consumers to connect purchased phones to any wireless service network
they choose).
88 See generally Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(concerning the defendant’s operation of a website that helped automate Craigslist ad
postings); Craigslist, Inc. v. Hubert, 278 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (similar to Naturemarket,
but here the competing service focused on allowing users to store information for ads that
could be uploaded to market websites at later times).
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H. CURRENT, ONGOING LITIGATION

A federal judge partially denied summary judgment in a case challenging
§1201 of the DMCA as being unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. 89
This lawsuit challenges §1201 because the plaintiffs believe it “has interfered with
educational uses of copyrighted works, accessibility, security research, remix art,
and even your ability to repair your own car or tractor.”90 While the results of
this lawsuit are likely a long way off, it does represent the possibility that §1201
could be struck down on constitutional grounds. This Note, however, will
critique §1201 not on constitutional grounds, but on market principles of
competition and innovation. As of the time of this publication, there are no
lawsuits challenging the law on those grounds, which may not be feasible, but
this paper advocates for legislative efforts to remedy the law’s deficiencies.
III. ANALYSIS
Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is controversial. A
cost-benefit analysis shows that the benefits exceed the costs in repealing the
provision and allowing for adversarial interoperability. This section will analyze
those costs and benefits and then look at an illustrative pair of cases to
demonstrate what sorts of competition would have been held as permissible in
the absence of the legislation’s restrictive provision.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR ADVERSARIAL INTEROPERABILITY

Adversarial interoperability facilitated the rise of the current dominance of
the tech giants.91 Proscribing any further adversarial interoperability cements the
tech giants’ dominant status and disincentivizes competition that benefits the
average consumers.92
The benefits of adversarial interoperability can be widespread.93 Cases
demonstrate an attempt to create tangible goods which open new avenues of
89 Memorandum Opinion, Green v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-01492-EGS
(D.D.C. July 27, 2019).
90 Kit Walsh, First Amendment Case Against Restrictive Copyright Law Can Proceed, Says Judge,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
DEEPLINKS
BLOG
(June
28,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/first-amendment-case-against-restrictivecopyright-law-can-proceed-says-judge.
91 Doctorow, supra note 5.
92 Cory Doctorow, Adversarial Interoperability, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 19,
2019) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/adversarial-interoperability.
93 Cory Doctorow, Interoperability and Privacy: Squaring the Circle, TECH POLICY GREENHOUSE
BY
TECHDIRT
(June
10,
2020)
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200609/13350244675/interoperability-privacysquaring-circle.shtml.
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usability for product owners as in the Playstation case.94 Perhaps more
important, however, would be proscribed competition involving intangible uses
of platform information. This is the kind of adversarial interoperability used by
Facebook when it overtook Myspace, and this will be the type of adversarial
interoperability most useful in creating genuine competition for the tech giants. 95
When Facebook was being rolled out, Myspace was the dominant player in
the social media sphere.96 Myspace had a catalog of users, and thus, Facebook
designed a tool that allowed its own users to communicate with Myspace users.97
Facebook’s messaging system could directly message individuals on Myspace
which took away Myspace’s status as the only viable option and served as a direct
advertisement to Myspace users of Facebook’s capabilities.98 Myspace was not
an untouchable competitor, but a competitor that could serve as a resource with
a “reservoir of conveniently organized potential users. . . that could be easily
reached with a compelling pitch about why they should switch.”99 Facebook
now has nearly 2.5 billion users, many of whom are dissatisfied with the platform
and its product.100 This presents a unique opportunity for a competitor to make
a move and keep Facebook on its toes.
This competition can benefit consumers by either directly challenging a firm’s
dominance in the same way Facebook did Myspace or by encouraging a
pluralistic dismantling of the platforms altogether. If a competitor could reverse
engineer a way to access communication channels or contact information of
another party’s website membership, that competing company could allow
members to partially detach from the service and enable them to defect to a
small, tailored alternative.
For example, Facebook has individual group pages and other sites have
marketplaces or forums. A competing entity, however, could target the highly
specific and unique needs of specialized groups, like cancer survivors, and create
a network or service for those individuals. Adversarial interoperability would
allow them to continue to exchange messages with members who still have not
left the dominant platform. The new platform could encrypt or otherwise

94 See, e.g., Sony, 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (concerning the creation of “mod chips” that enabled
Playstation owners to run third-party software on the consoles).
95 Doctorow, supra note 5.
96 Harrison Jacobs, Former MySpace CEO Explains How Facebook Was Able to Dominate Social
Media
Despite
Coming
Second,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(May
9,
2015)
https://www.businessinsider.com/former-myspace-ceo-explains-why-facebook-was-able-todominate-social-media-despite-coming-second-2015-5.
97 Doctorow, supra note 5.
98 Id. (demonstrating the appeal of Facebook’s messaging technology, especially because
the messages appeared on Myspace with a footer describing Facebook’s superiority over
Myspace).
99 Id.
100 Doctorow, supra note 5.
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protect parts of messages going out to the other platform, with footer messages
letting the recipient know how to join the new platform. Imagine someone
created an account with Diaspora, a Facebook alternative premised on the
assumption that decentralized data caches are superior to data hosted on central
servers. To reach Facebook contacts, this individual would need interoperability
for messages to reach across platforms. There is certainly an argument to be
made that value exists in having large numbers of people reachable on one
platform—network effects are powerful, after all.101 Nonetheless, the benefits
of change would likely outweigh those of the status quo.
This scenario has the potential to serve two important functions. First,
provide consumers the opportunity to find and use a service that is tailored to
their needs. Dominant platforms are often used out of convenience, and it is
nearly impossible to start from scratch.102 Second, inform the dominant
platform of the specific services or capabilities its users are genuinely interested
in—at least interested in enough to be willing to leave the platform—and they
can attempt to change course.103 The whole purpose of competition is to
continue pushing and encouraging advancement.
There are billions of people with countless needs and interests. If dominant
platforms with millions of subscribers are subject to competition from
innovators attuned to those needs, the dominant player either improves or is
nibbled to death by ducks, leaving behind a constellation of community-driven
alternatives.
Large tech companies have proven very resistant to allowing such
interoperability.104 Facebook filed lawsuits to shut down Power Ventures, a tech
company that designed a platform that would allow users to manage their social
media accounts or profiles from a single website.105 Facebook wanted to
maintain complete control over all user data, and as the sheer size of its user base
increases, that control becomes significantly more important. 106
As an alternative to forcing Facebook to allow competing platforms to
communicate with and potentially siphon off users, adversarial interoperability
may also serve to remedy some of the real consequences of Facebook controlling

Doctorow, supra note 5.
Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2019).
103 Id. (describing Facebook users’ attempts at using third-party ad-blocking software giving
Facebook notice of those desires, and Facebook’s unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate a
change in course to acknowledge that user interest).
104 Doctorow, supra note 5.
105 Facebook v. Power Ventures, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG,
https://www.eff.org/cases/facebook-v-power-ventures (last visited Sept. 28, 2020)
(describing the 2008 lawsuit in which Facebook successfully sued Power Ventures under
various legal theories because of its accessing Facebook’s data); Facebook, Inc. v. Power. Ventures,
Inc., 844 F.Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
106 Id.
101
102
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so much user data, such as the Cambridge Analytica debacle.107 This problem
emerged when a political consulting firm was given access to personal
information for over 87 million Facebook users through the creation of a quiz
developed specifically through Facebook’s own application programming
interface (“API”).108 While critics of adversarial interoperability maintain that
tech companies must “be able to observe and analyze everything every user does,
both to train automated filers and to allow them to block abusers” and allowing
interoperability weakens that ability to monitor and control users’ bad
behavior,109 that line of thinking relies on the faulty assumption that a party like
Facebook actually has the will and ability to stop billions of people from abusing
the systems and each other.110
Facebook’s sheer size has created tremendous problems and is indicative of
others.111 The company is obsessed with active user metrics, leading to the
creation and implementation of “addictive design theories.”112 One such
measure was the creation of the “People You May Know” feature.113 This
seemingly innocuous addition allows users to digitally connect their real-life
network by accessing users’ address books in efforts even Facebook officers
deemed “questionable contact-importing practices.”114 This practice led to an
almost unbelievable string of problems.115 One man was connected to his secret
biological daughter because the couple he donated sperm to was still in his
address book, and psychologists’ patients were connected because they all had
contact information in a common address book.116 Because of Facebook’s
continual hoarding of user information, there is simply too much of it in one
place to comfortably believe data security is genuinely feasible.117

107 See Ghosh and Scott, supra note 82 (discussing major issues stemming from Facebook’s
most famous data scandal).
108 Alvin Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Scandal, Explained with a Simple Diagram,
VOX,
(May
2,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/23/17151916/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram (outlining how
Cambridge Analytica, through Facebook’s API system, created a quiz that allowed the
company to harvest and then sell data from 87 million users without their knowledge or
permission).
109 Doctorow, supra note 5.
110 Id.
111 Hannah Kuchler, How Facebook Grew Too Big to Handle, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/be723754-501c-11e9-9c76-bf4a0ce37d49.
112 See Id.(quoting a former Google employee discussing “the industry’s relentless pursuit of
user time and attention”).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Doctorow, supra note 5.
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Nothing about Facebook’s past gives a strong or reasonable inclination that
the organization possesses the requisite will or capacity to secure user data or
interests and to prevent the next Cambridge Analytica scandal.
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADVERSARIAL INTEROPERABILITY

Major players would vigorously condemn any measure that significantly
allowed for adversarial interoperability.118 Some of the bases for this stance
would have merit. Adversarial interoperability can be dangerous or
undesirable.119 A recent suit was filed by WhatsApp (owned by Facebook)
against an Israeli company for using spyware fitted to the WhatsApp platform to
infect phone and surveil 1,400 users.120 The defendant’s conduct was expressly
forbidden by the WhatsApp terms of service.121 It involved the development of
special malware that translated encrypted messages from WhatsApp to allow for
that content to be mined.122 Opponents of adversarial interoperability would
contend that such invasions of privacy could only be prevented by their ability
to sue the offending parties. Furthermore, Facebook’s sheer size and practice of
hoarding metadata can help in these situations. It would allow analysts to dig
through the data to try and learn something from the hacking attempts and to
boost security using that learned information. 123
However, the idea that allowing for adversarial interoperability would prevent
major players from suing or trying to prevent NSO type infractions holds little
water. Indeed, WhatsApp’s complaint against NSO includes causes of action
based in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the California Comprehensive
Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, and contract breach theories.124
If a party chooses to use adversarial interoperability measures to carry out
illegal surveillance activities or to pursue another endeavor that obviously violates
public policy, there are enforcement regimes in place to tackle those problems as

See id.(describing major players as “notorious” opponents of interoperability).
Thierer, supra note 30.
120 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Tech. Ltd.,
No. 3:19-cv-07123-JSC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019), 2019 WL 5571028. See also Nicole Perlroth,
WhatsApp Says Israeli Firm Used its App in Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/technology/whatsapp-nso-lawsuit.html.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Nicholas Weaver, Lessons (So Far) From WhatsApp v. NSO, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 5,
2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-so-far-whatsapp-v-nso (detailing Facebook’s
ability to notify each individual hacking target and boosting privacy and security for those
individuals).
124 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Tech. Ltd., No.
3:19-cv-07123-JSC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019), 2019 WL 5571028.
118
119
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they come up.125 Certain tech companies might have a diminished cache of
metadata to use when designing security measures if competitors absorb some
of their market share.126 This alone is no reason to discourage competition. Just
because a provider has grown to enormous size and has commensurate resources
does not mean its dominant status should be protected just for the sake of
continuity.
Other arguments center around the notion that adversarial interoperability
amounts to theft. Whether it is a web browser extension that allows for users to
block ads or measures that allow access to a platform’s user base, something of
value is lost by the target platform.
While the dominant players’ use of adversarial interoperability was a vehicle
for progress, the current uses are vehicles for crimes. It is hypocritical to make
use of a tool to establish viability in the market and then try to ensure the tool
can never be used again.
C. THE CRAIGSLIST CASES

Craigslist initiated several lawsuits challenging other parties from offering
services that worked alongside the Craigslist platform.127 In these cases, the
defending party created a service that allowed for its subscribers to automatically
post its sales advertisements on Craigslist’s platform.128 The creation of these
services and software programs violated the Craigslist terms of service agreed to
by the defending parties.129
While there are certainly valid concerns to be raised concerning spam and
automated advertisements, giving consumers the opportunity to save and store
ad information for later use on the website is a valuable service that does not
threaten the existence of the primary platform. In Kerbel, the utility of the service

125 See,
e.g. Abuse Using Technology, WOMENSLAW.ORG (Aug. 23, 2016)
https://www.womenslaw.org/about-abuse/abuse-using-technology/ways-abusers-misusetechnology/electronic-surveillance-spying-2 (describing applicable laws and statutes regarding
unauthorized digital surveillance and harassment).
126 See Brian Contos, Making Metadata Meaningful for Network Security, CSOONLINE (Oct. 30,
2013)
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2135537/making-metadata-meaningful-fornetwork-security.html (describing the usefulness of metadata caches in developing security
measures).
127 See Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047-49 (N.D. Cal. 2010);
see also 278 F.R.D. 510, 512; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Kerbel, No. C-11-3309 EMC, 2012 WL
3166798 at *1. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012).
128 Maria Dinzeo, Craigslist Seeks to Stop Auto-Posting Software, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Oct. 8,
2009) https://www.courthousenews.com/craigslist-seeks-to-stop-auto-posting-software/.
129 Id.
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was ignored entirely in the court’s granting of a default judgment for Craigslist
on the §1201 claims.130
If a platform is concerned with spam messages or other problems that can
arise from competitor access to digital infrastructure, reasonable restrictions can
be put into place to discourage or penalize flagrant violations. 131 However,
wholesale proscription of third-party services from accessing platforms only
serves to prop up the host platform at the expense of the consumer
experience.132
D. THE FRENCH CONNECTION: LESSONS FROM FRANCE’S INTEROPERABILITY
REGULATIONS

As laws similar to §1201 of DMCA have developed in other countries, the
impact of technological protection measures (TPM) have been felt by consumers
globally. In response to consumer criticisms, the French Parliament passed the
“Loi Relative au Droit d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la Société
l’Information” (DADVSI) in 2006, which attempts “to counterbalance the rights
granted to copyright owners, through the protection of TPMs, with guarantees
for consumers of cultural goods, notably in terms of interoperability of these
TPMs.”133
DADVSI included a requirement that TPMs not prevent “effective
interoperability between digital file formats and the various software and devices
on which they can be played.”134 In 2007, France created l’Autorité de
Régulation des Mesures Techniques (ARMT), to enforce the interoperability
mandate.135 This independent authority could impose hefty fines.136 This
apparatus was limited in effect because the rules defining the parties eligible to

130 Craigslist, Inc. v. Kerbel, No. C-11-3309 EMC, 2012 WL 3166798 at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 2, 2012).
131 See Don Marti, Note on Adversarial Interoperability, ZGP BLOG (Nov. 16, 2019)
https://blog.zgp.org/adversarial-interoperability/ (describing Usenet as a cautionary tale
against adversarial interoperability, but suggesting stronger, dedicated spam filters as a
solution).
132 See Doctorow, supra note 5 (explaining that growing reliance on digital rights
management creates legal obligations to use products in only the way developers wish,
boosting their profits at the expense of the user).
133 Jane K. Winn & Nicolas Jondet, A New Deal for End Users? Lessons from a French Innovation
in the Regulation of Interoperability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 552 (2009),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/141.
134 Id. at 555 (describing how French lawmakers were particularly focused on issues with
digital music and Apple’s use of TPMs to tether iTunes music purchases to iPod device
playback).
135 Id.
136 Id.
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bring an interoperability case forward were so strict that the rules “might ensure
that no interoperability case would ever be brought.”137
While there are certainly limitations in what the regime can accomplish, the
effort was not completely toothless. The existence of a regulatory body “may
have played an important part in Apple’s decision in early 2007 to push record
labels to offer digital music without TPMs . . . the prospect of dealing with
French regulators could have been the deciding factor in the company’s change
of direction.”138
The United States could similarly pursue a position with the interests of
consumers in mind. French efforts were focused on access to materials with a
cultural connection: music, the arts, and the like.139 American efforts could also
be narrow in scope. Regardless, steps taken by the American government to
legitimize interoperability would send a clear message to dominant tech players
that their time of invulnerability from competition is over.
IV. CONCLUSION
The dominant technology companies competed to reach their statuses as
industry titans. In a world rapidly becoming more technology-dependent,
innovation and improvements are more important than ever. Allowing tech
giants to be insulated in their positions of power does not enhance the consumer
experience. By subjecting tech giants to the same competitive tactics they used
to reach levels of success, consumers can get what they want and tech companies
will be forced to improve. These improvements are wanted and needed. As tech
giants continue to grow, the threat they pose to competition and notions of data
security also grow. The United States should take steps to legitimize
interoperability and inform the marketplace of such efforts. This ultimately
promotes fairness, innovation, and consumer interests.

137 Id. at 561 (explaining that this avenue is open only to a select group of tech-related
companies such as software publishers, technical system manufacturers, or service providers).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 555.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss1/6

22

